Father Toño arrested in El Salvador, alleged gang involvement

Salvadoran authorities were busy on Wednesday. They arrested Roman Catholic priest Antonio Rodriguez Tercero. They allege that Father Toño "tried to get favorable treatment for Salvadoran gang members and helped smuggled contraband into prisons" (including cell phones and drugs) but that is all we know so far. In addition, authorities arrested 12 police officers, two judges, a number of court employees, two prosecution officials, and various gang members - 125 in total. They are accused of having collaborated with the 18th Street gang [and other criminal groups].

While Father Toño worked with the gangs in Mejicanos for a number of years, he was very critical of the government's facilitation of a truce between the country's two main gains. However, after discussions with Bishop Fabio Colindres last year, Father Toño changed his mind and then became a supporter of the national truce [and then became an opponent once again].

@serobbins is now providing updates on Twitter.

Strategy...what strategy? The Funes Government and Gangs in El Salvador

The Journal of Latin American Studies also has "De-securitising and Re-securitising Gang Policies: The Funes Government and Gangs in El Salvador" (gated) by Chris Van Der Borgh and Wim Savenije in its most recent edition.

This article analyses the gang policies of the first years of the Funes administration in El Salvador, from June 2009 until July 2012. Using securitisation theory, it explains why the administration returned to an emphasis on extraordinary measures, most of them repressive, to deal with gangs. It argues that these measures were the product of an ongoing and dynamic process in which the government was but one of the players in a complex field constituted by numerous actors. The return to repressive measures as well as the support and facilitation of a ‘gang truce’ were not the result of a rational design or a predetermined agenda, but should be seen as a series of moves in a political conjuncture, in which the Salvadorean government needed to communicate to different audiences messages of being in control.

I appreciated the discussion of the Funes administration's gang policy upon taking office and up through 2011. The Funes administration entered office intending to de-securitise the government's approach to gangs. However, the gangs were too strong, the government did not have adequate policies to effectively deal with gang prevention and rehabilitation, and the media, public and private sector had little little patience for policies that that did not look tough. The government considered negotiating with gangs at this time (2009-2010) but decided not to do so.

I don't think that the article was too strong on what led the administration to support the 2012 gang truce but there we see another two-pronged schizophrenic policy as well. )The authors might have been able to put together a stronger second half of the paper had they written it with what we know in 2014.) At the same time that the government was involved in facilitating a truce between the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, it was cracking down on gang activities. I remember receiving emails from a friend last year from a friend in San Salvador who talked about the heavy-handed police and military presence in poor neighborhoods. They were kicking down doors, roughing up young men, and threatening those who got in the way...all while the truce was still pretty strong.

The administration had hoped that its continued arrest and prosecution of gang members and reliance on the military would provide them with the political cover to support an unpopular gang truce. It didn't work. The government never did gain the support of the population or the United States for the truce and homicides have increased 70 percent during the first six months of the year.

One Parish Priest in El Salvador's Popular Movement...the FMLN

The Journal of Latin American Studies (now on Twitter at @JLAScamb) has two interesting articles on El Salvador in their most recent edition. The first takes a look at the life of Tecoluca's Father David Rodriguez. "Ideas and Leaders in Contentious Politics: One Parish Priest in El Salvador's Popular Movement" written by Loyola University Chicago's Peter Sanchez.

This paper examines the actions of one Salvadorean priest – Padre David Rodríguez – in one parish – Tecoluca – to underscore the importance of religious leadership in the rise of El Salvador's contentious political movement that began in the early 1970s, when the guerrilla organisations were only just beginning to develop. Catholic leaders became engaged in promoting contentious politics, however, only after the Church had experienced an ideological conversion, commonly referred to as liberation theology.

A focus on one priest, in one parish, allows for generalisation, since scores of priests, nuns and lay workers in El Salvador followed the same injustice frame and tactics that generated extensive political mobilisation throughout the country. While structural conditions, collective action and resource mobilisation are undoubtedly necessary, the case of religious leaders in El Salvador suggests that ideas and leadership are of vital importance for the rise of contentious politics at a particular historical moment.

While we generally tend to identify the Salvadoran civil war as beginning in 1979 (following the failure of the October 15 coup) or 1980 (Romero's murder or the creation of the FMLN), it is important to remember that the Salvadoran guerrillas spent the entire 1970s, even as early as the late 1960s, preparing for war. They were recruiting new members, developing their ideology, and raising money, often through kidnappings.

In this article, we learn about Father Rodriguez who integrated into the FPL in 1974. He went on to live a pretty interesting life which isn't covered in this article except for Footnote number 62 - always read the footnotes.

Padre Rodríguez worked for the FPL from 1975 until the end of the civil war in 1992, also working for the FMLN when the FPL joined that organisation. Rodríguez did not serve as a combatant, but rather helped to organise CEBs and later raised money for the armed rebellion and for communities in guerrilla-controlled territory, travelling to the United States, Europe and Latin America. At the end of the conflict he made an effort to return to the Church, but the bishop of San Vicente at the time insisted that he issue an apology for the revolutionary and political path he had taken, a condition that he found unacceptable. Eventually Padre Rodríguez continued working with the FMLN, which was transforming itself into a political party, and became a candidate for the Legislative Assembly in 1997. He was elected in 1997 and 2000, and more recently in 2009 and 2012. Thus Padre David Rodríguez, a traditional parish priest, became a liberationist priest, a guerrilla priest and finally a political priest, always retaining close ties to the Salvadorean peasantry

The second article comes tomorrow.

A busy few weeks to cover Central America

Good morning everybody. I'm still trying to catch up on all the news as I was down in New York and at the Bronx Zoo this weekend. I know I connected with a number of new followers on Twitter within the last few weeks (thanks @incakolanews!). If you'd like to know more about me, you can read this post from last year as well as the links above to my scholarship and public writing. And now to some links.

NPR's Carrie Kahn takes a look at what is being done to tackle coffee rust which is devastating Central American coffee production. US AID as well as Starbucks and other private companies are spending millions of dollars to help Central American producers to save the coffee crops and to overcome the fungus. As of right now, there's no solid evidence that the migrant surge is connected to coffee rust (we don't really know) but it sure seems to be affecting the decisions of some rural inhabitants to head north. In a potentially positive development, Guatemala's national coffee industry announced the existence of a coffee plant that seems to be resistant to the fungus. It's been around since 1984.

Tim has two good links. The first includes a 20-minute video on what life is like in El Salvador for young children. The second includes a variety of links to recent stories and op-eds on the surge in unaccompanied minors including the letter from those who study Central America that I posted last week. I'm with George Will - we can handle the challenge of "eight-year-old criminals with their teddy bears" without deporting them en masse back to Central America although I'm hoping that the 20 kids in each US county statement was just for dramatic effect. More trade between the US and the region and less drug consumption in the US are parts of any potential solution.

President Otto Perez Molina wants $2 billion from the US to help deal with the region's challenges. I'm not sure where he gets the $2 billion from again (unless it was just the US should spend 10% of the $20 billion that it spends on the border in Central America). OPM and Honduran President Hernandez are looking for a plan Colombia for themselves. I think that someone needs to tell OPM that he already has a bit of Plan Colombia in Guatemala. 

Colombian trainers are there working with his security forces as is Colombian Iván Velásquez Gómez who is in charge of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Velásquez helped to strengthen Colombia's judicial institutions which is one of the main reasons why his country has improved so much in recent years. While in Colombia, Velásquez carried out "high-profile investigations into links between paramilitary groups and public officials." And how are he and CICIG doing in Guatemala? OPM said that his government will not extend CICIG's mandate and it is not clear at all that they have been supportive of CICIG's work to investigate the connections between organized crime and Guatemalan public officials. How about the US offer to fund CICIG for five-to-ten more years? What say you, Mr. President?

 You should also jump through to read OPM's statements about the Cold war - they are pretty laughable. 

And just a few more...Homicides are up approximately 70 percent in El Salvador...It's been a bad week for mayors (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras)...A Nicaraguan bus driver was arrested for having possibly been involved in the recent bus attack that killed several Sandinista supporters...Some thoughts from me in this recent Washington Post article.

And what are you going to do when you go home Mr. President?

Jose Miguel Cruz has an op-ed in today's Miami Herald on The real failure in Central America while Michael Shifter has one in Politico on Central America’s Apology Tour: Latin leaders have a lot of explaining to do. Michael and Jose Miguel don't want the failure of the US to pass immigration reform or to reduce its demand for illicit drugs to distract every one's attention away from the failure of Central American political and economic elites to clean up their own houses.

Here's Dr. Cruz

In the early 1990s, far-reaching political transitions, wrought by successful peace agreements, created expectations that these poverty-stricken countries would somehow flourish as vibrant democracies and thriving market economies.

Since then, the international community and, especially, the United States have spent billions of dollars trying to strengthen national and regional institutions in Central America in an effort to create the conditions for rule of law and democracy. Data collected by the Washington Office on Latin America show that, since 2003, international cooperation in citizen security programs in Central America has amounted to over $1.7 billion, with the United States providing the lion’s share, more than 36 percent of the assistance.

But, as it has turned out, things have gone hopelessly awry. Part of the problem centers on how these reforms were implemented, as local elites maneuvered to promote old-regime security operators at the helm of law-enforcement institutions. Many of those officials were already implicated in abuses and illegal activities.

And Mr. Shifter

Still, Central American leaders are hardly blameless. The Obama administration is right to urge them to more seriously tackle domestic challenges, including corruption, which is pervasive and shows few signs of abating. Central Americans in positions of power have not done nearly enough to advance the rule of law, promote economic opportunities and help construct a decent life for their poorest citizens. Guatemala’s notably low tax burden, at just over 11 percent, is often cited to illustrate the failure of the country’s most well-to-do to assume their responsibility to finance basic public services. Some voices in the private sector are calling for higher income taxes, but progress has been disappointing and resistance remains enormous. With few exceptions, political figures and public officials have stood in the way of dealing with the spreading criminality, proliferation of gangs and penetration of organized crime in all institutions. Gangs are more common in El Salvador and Honduras; corruption stemming from the drug trade paralyzes Honduras and Guatemala. Since 2012, more than 200 police officers in Guatemala have been purged and are awaiting trial for their collusion with criminal organizations.

While the presidents of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala travel to the White House today to lobby President Obama for greater assistance in dealing with the exodus and forced return of their region's youth, the US should not be afraid to ask - "What are you going to do yourselves?"

Here are some of the issues that President Obama might discuss with Guatemalan President Perez Molina that I came up with somewhat tongue-in-cheek last month.

Scholars of Central America reach out to White House on unaccompanied minors

I am one of 650+ Central Americanists who signed this letter to President Obama regarding our treatment of unaccompanied minors. Here is the letter. You can follow the link to see the signatures.

July 22, 2014

Dear Mr. President:

As scholars of Central America and migration who are familiar with the conditions that cause so many children to flee their homelands, and mindful of the historical relationship between the United States and this region, we call on your administration to treat the “unaccompanied minors” at the border as refugees who are deserving of protection, due process, and humane treatment. We ask that they have access to legal representation by volunteer or government­ funded lawyers, in order for them to be reunited with relatives. Young migrants arriving from the Northern Triangle—Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras—face real and credible threats to their lives and safety in their hometowns. Further, many of them already have parents or other relatives living and working in the United States. Both the conditions of extreme insecurity in their homelands and the hardships of family separation dictate that these youth should be reunited with family members in the U.S. as swiftly as possible.

The extreme violence and economic insecurity in Central America, as well as the role of migration as a survival strategy, have deep and well­ documented roots. The migration of children and youth from Central America is not new. Extortion and death threats from street gangs (some of which have their roots in Los Angeles) or organized criminals with ties to security forces have caused internal displacement and international migration for more than a decade. The local police cannot be trusted to protect these vulnerable communities and, indeed, are often part of the problem. While U.S. politicians apparently see this as a security problem for the U.S., to be resolved with more walls and detention centers, those who are truly living in insecurity and vulnerability are Salvadorans, Hondurans and Guatemalans.

Young people whose parents migrated earlier in search of economic survival are especially vulnerable. Public schools, which should provide safety and opportunity for local youth, are often avenues of gang recruitment. In El Salvador, our research shows, youth gangs within the public high schools are connected to one of the larger street gangs, either the 18th Street (Calle 18) or Mara Salvatrucha (or MS­13). Students who graduate from these institutes are regularly expected to join their respective gangs; those who refuse are threatened and some killed. In Guatemala, we have seen that those with migrant relatives are frequently targets for extortion. Indeed, migration often begins internally, as young people flee their homes to escape such threats. But it can be nearly impossible to escape the threats and assaults. The extortionists and gangs are present throughout all three countries, and local gang cliques can be linked to national and sometimes even transnational criminal networks; frequently, finding a job or even working as a vendor involves paying “rent” to the gangs. Without economic options, police protection, or basic public services, eventually many people see migration beyond national borders as the only option. While Costa Rica and México have also received an increase of asylum ­seekers from this region, the vast majority has come to the United States, where family ties and historical geopolitical relationships have made migration trajectories all but inevitable. Child testimonies reported recently in the media echo our long ­term research findings: these young people fear violence and hope to reunite with family members. Deportation would send many of them back to almost certain death and further destabilize the region, ultimately triggering more migration.

We want to emphasize that the United States is complicit in the conditions that cause so many to migrate. The reasons are many: U.S. historical support for military dictatorships and regimes of violence in the region; its promotion of free trade agreements and economic policies that have undermined subsistence agriculture and eroded public services, and its increasingly harsh immigration policies and practices that have separated families and deported too many whose livelihoods and security were in the United States. We have an opportunity and a responsibility now to make up for some past mistakes by offering humane treatment and consideration to the new arrivals and swiftly reuniting them with their family members.

SIGNED (Friday, July 18, 2014­ - Tuesday, July 22, 2014)

Don't forget about Nicaragua

While everyone's attention is on the Northern Triangle and the immigration challenge between those countries and the US, let's see what people are saying about Nicaragua.

First, we have two articles that cover the 35th anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution. David Broddiger and The Tico Times start it off with 35 years after Somoza's overthrow, not much for Nicaragua to celebrate. Growing intolerance, dissatisfaction with Nicaraguan democracy, authoritarian tendencies of Somoza, lack of spending on students, low wages, and the creation of a new multimillionaire club.

Rose Spalding also looks at the July 19th Anniversary and the New Nicaragua for the AULA Blog. Spalding focuses on the relationship between Ortega and COSEP (the business community) - :Even as the government-business relationship warms and the economy grows, these social and political concerns continue to bedevil the country."

Ortega's been moving in on the non-partisan and highly respected military as well.

While Sandinista supporters were returning from the July 19th celebrations, two buses were attacked by small heavily armed groups - The Return of the Contras? Massacre of Sandinistas Stirs Old Ghosts in Nicaragua.

Finally, there is a bit of a dueling narrative on why Nicaraguans are not fleeing towards the US like its neighbors. CATO's Alex Nowrasteh and NicaNet have the positive reasons while Sergio Ramirez focuses on Costa Rica where 10 percent of the population are of Nicaraguan descent.

Nicaragua has a lot going for it compared to its Northern Triangle neighbors right now but there are a number of signs that do not bode well for its future.

How did I miss the unaccompanied minors story?

One of the many things that has bothered me about the crisis of unaccompanied minors on the border is that I totally missed the story as the number of young people from Central America exploded over the last two-plus years. President Obama was warned over a year ago and frankly others have been warning about the number of children and Central Americans for quite some time yet the story wasn't on my radar.

One of the reasons is that I don't focus on immigration and the border very often. When I do write about immigration, I tend to focus on Temporary Protected Status for Guatemalans, support for comprehensive immigration reform, and the record number of undocumented immigrants that the US have been deported under President Obama.

Overall immigration apprehensions have been down and even some of the estimates from El Salvador that I would hear showed the same trend. People used to say that 800 people were leaving each day but more recently I would hear that only 500 people were leaving each day.

Second, while the Northern Triangle remains a very violent region, homicides rates have decreased in each country the last two years, four in Guatemala. It is possible that Guatemala finishes 2014 with a rate of 30 per 100,000 which would put its rate on a level with every one's success story - Colombia.

But there's a lack of trust in homicide rates and an understanding that violence is much more than homicides. So I decided to look through LAPOP's survey results from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These are from 2012 surveys so we don't have 2013 or 2014 here.

Salvadorans have high levels of insecurity but perceptions of insecurity improved from 2010 to 2012. El Salvador has intermediate levels of crime victimization for the entire region. Seventeen percent of Salvadorans surveyed were direct victims of crime, while 28.5% of households reported some person who was victimized within the past year - about the regional average. Self-reported levels of personal victimization also improved between 2010 and 2012.

Self-reported crime victimization also decreased in Guatemala over the same two-year period - 23% to 21% for personal victimization - although the change is not statistically significant. Even optimism about the economy improved from 41.6 to 45.3!

In Honduras, perceptions of insecurity improved perceptions of insecurity improved from 34 to 32.1 between 2010 and 2012 - at exactly the same time that the murder rate was taking off.

What can explain the reduction in the perception of insecurity in spite of the increase of crime in the country? A possible reason is reflected in the changes in principal problems of the country identified by Hondurans. In Figure 66 we can see that between 2008 and 2010 the economic crisis dominated the perceptions of Hondurans as the most serious problem facing the country. The political crisis of 2009 and the political and institutional problems that were the root of the crisis are what received most mentions in 2012. Therefore, despite the elevated levels of crime, political and economic problems are those that were emphasized with most frequency by Hondurans. We think that this distribution of problems can explain why levels of perception of insecurity has decreased and is below countries with lower levels of violence. 

However, unlike Guatemala and El Salvador, crime victimization worsened in Honduras between 2010 and 2012 from 14% to 18.9%. It is interesting to note that self-reported crime victimization is still below its height in 2006 when it reached 19.2% (probably no statistical difference but...).

Crime and the economy are motivating people from Central America to leave the region and, in most cases, go to the US. However, the link is not straightforward. And at the same time that murder rates and self-reported victims of crime improved except for Honduras.

It gets even more interesting when you factor in that fewer people stated an intention to leave their country and migrate between 2010 and 2012. If intentions were decreasing into 2012, why did larger numbers of unaccompanied minors and families increase so dramatically later that year and the next one and into 2014? That seems to be where US policy comes into play.

How could family reunification feed youth into gangs, even if both immigrant parents are working?

Middlebury's David Stoll published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal on the costs and benefits of immigration between Guatemala and the United States last week which I commented on here. He brought up some good points on the downside to remittances and family reunification that often go unmentioned in the press but that are part of the academic conversation that has been taking place. He sent along some comments to my questions which he has generously allowed me to share with you.

Mike, thanks for your observations.  You ask, how could family reunification feed youth into gangs, even if both immigrant parents are working?

My reference to downward mobility could have used a bit more explanation.

The best ethnography I’ve seen on this point is Robert Smith's Mexican New York.  It’s about a Mexican migration stream, from Puebla to the Bronx, with far more legal status than the Guatemalans with whom I work.

While a stateside working couple’s son is still in Mexico, being cared for by his grandparents and receiving remittances in Mexico, he’s at the top of the consumption pyramid for the small town where he lives.  Once reunited with his parents in the Bronx, he’s living in a leaky basement with parents who are too busy working to make ends meet for anything else.  And of course their meager wages-even two wages in New York's heavily informalized service economy- have very little purchasing power.  So that’s downward mobility in terms of what his parents’ wages can buy. Then there's the problem of how the little guy makes it down the street without being challenged by other young neighborhood males.

As for humanitarian advocacy, my objection is that it can be extended to most of the population of the Third World.  If "57,000 helpless children" (to quote the NYT editorial board yesterday) each deserve a lawyer, a court hearing, time to prepare their case, and therefore provisional legal status in the U.S., then so does every other under-18er in Central America whose parents can pay to get him to the U.S. border.   This amounts to a humanitarian rationale for opening the U.S. labor market to any family who is sufficiently desperate or bold to borrow the money needed to pay human smugglers.

This is not to deny the existence of genuine refugees from gang violence who need our help. But how to pick them out of the surge of youth labor migration which, as far as I can see, probably constitute the bulk of the youth surge.

I'd like to thank David for the comments. 

Despite U.S. Efforts, Root Causes of Migration Prevail in Central America

I have a new briefing in the World Politics Review this morning entitled Despite U.S. Efforts, Root Causes of Migration Crisis Prevail in Central America (I would add U.S. and Central American Efforts). Here's the conclusion

While investing more resources in the region might reduce the number of individuals traveling to the U.S., it is unclear that this will be enough to significantly alter the pressures that are compelling people to leave. Approximately 4 million people of Salvadoran, Honduran and Guatemalan descent live in the U.S., and the remittances they send home comprise 15-20 percent of each country’s GDP and help millions avoid or survive poverty. Not too long ago, the goal of many of them was to earn enough money in the U.S. to be able to one day return home, buy a house, start a business and retire somewhat comfortably. It seems that might no longer be the case. The poor economic and security conditions have deterred many from returning. Instead, parents living in the U.S. are paying for their children and spouses to travel north for family reunification.

Economic and family reunification pressures are not going to become any less important over the coming years, as drug trafficking, gang violence and organized crime continue to overwhelm the already weak and corrupt police forces and governments in all three countries. Citizens can trust neither the criminals nor the state. Sending their children on the dangerous journey north might not be their first choice, but the alternatives are no less daunting.

The US and our Central American partners have been working for decades to improve conditions in the region. However, it is clear that the resources that we have committed have not been enough (money, people, high-level attention) and some have been counterproductive (mano dura, perhaps DR-CAFTA, an escalation of the drug war, failure to reverse the 2009 coup).

Some see improving conditions as a moral issue to make up for past US involvement; others to stem the flow of immigration; and and others to tackle the root causes of violence - but I am not sure that there are many people who are not interested in improving the region's conditions. Obviously, though, there is a lot of disagreement over how to improve those conditions.

We need to work together to strengthen democracy, emphasize job creation and sustainable development, increase investment in basic social needs, make illicit drug consumption less violent, and provide a reasonable, safe way for people to come and go between the US and the Northern Triangle for family and work reasons.

You can read the Briefing here.

US could grant Temporary Protected Status to Guatemalans

President Obama is scheduled to meet with the leaders of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras at the White House this week. They are obviously going to discuss the recent flood of unaccompanied minors and families leaving the region for the United States. Vice President Biden is hosting them for lunch. Perhaps they are going to announce some new initiative but who knows.

President Obama could ask the Department of Homeland Security to move forward on granting Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to nationals of Guatemala. If we look at the map of where migrants are coming from in Guatemala, a large percentage are coming from the Western Highlands.

Gang violence is not as much as an issue there (though drug trafficking is) which is part of the reason why US officials claim that most Guatemalan migrants are leaving for economic reasons. The heavily indigenous highlands have some of the highest rates of poverty and malnutrition in the entire country.

This area of the country has been hit hard by earthquakes in September 2011, November 2012, and July 2014. If he does not want to extend TPS to all Guatemalans (which he could easily justify because of other natural disasters affecting the entire country), perhaps he could offer it to those migrants who are departing the western regions like San Marcos, Huehuetenango, Quiche, Totonicapan, and Quetzaltenango.

TPS for Guatemala does not help El Salvador and Honduras (many of whose citizens in the US already have TPS) and probably won't make a dent in the number of migrants leaving the region (that requires long-term structural changes) but The United States should grant TPS for Guatemala.

Questionable Compassion for Child Immigrants - Colbert Report

From last night's Colbert Report - Questionable Compassion for Child Immigrants for child refugees from "Guatemala, Honduras, and El Diablo."

The Colbert Report
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Belize's money laundering regime

Grace Kranstover and Ragini Chatterjee, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, take a look at The State's Secret: Belize's Money Laundering Regime.

Nestled on the northeastern coast of Central America, Belize is often named one of Central America’s most beautiful vacation destinations. With its ornate coral reefs and rainforest, the small English-speaking country has plenty to offer for tourists looking for tropical adventures. Yet, Belize is rapidly becoming known to the international community for attracting many drug trafficking organizations known for transporting marijuana and cocaine into North America. Since the country’s currency is conveniently pegged to the U.S. dollar, Belize also offers nonresidents the opportunity to run offshore accounts. Money laundering has become a prime form of funding for many criminal organizations. As a result, the United States Department of State has recently named Belize one of the world’s “major money laundering countries.”[1]

But it's not just about money laundering. Take a look at what Julie Lopez wrote last year with Organized Crime and Insecurity in Belize. I provided a few comments as well that will show up in Belize's 2013 Freedom in the World Report.

Should the US deport unaccompanied minors?

I have a new post up at Al Jazeera on Should the US deport unaccompanied minors? Let's just say that I answer "no" and that we should look to big picture items to manage the flow of people between Central American and the United States. Here's the concluding paragraph:

The problems in Central America are immense. We need to consider deepening our already close economic relations, craft policies that facilitate migration between the US and the region, jointly invest billions of dollars in development projects, and enact drug policy reforms. I am afraid reforms short of these will probably just help at the margins. 

Basically, I went with more freedom. The US and Central America, as well as Mexico, should look to policies that give Central Americans more freedom to move in search of labor. We should design policies that allow people to move more freely in search of family. Approximately four million people of Salvadoran, Guatemalan and Honduran descent live in the US while only thirty million remain in the region. Economic and family reunification pressures are not going to become any less important over the coming years. Finally, we need to tackle regional drug policy and give people more freedom to access what is today an ultra-violent, multi-billion dollar corrosive industry.

I don't see all these reforms happening overnight but I do see the US, Mexico, and Central America becoming more fully integrated in the future, let's say by 2050 or 2100.

It was a difficult op-ed to write. There were so many ways to go addressing the current crisis. At one point, my submission was over 1,800 words before I managed to bring it back to 1,203. Obviously, there was a lot of material left on the cutting wrong floor.

Immigration and family reunification aren't all they are cracked up to be

David Stoll has a good contribution to the unaccompanied minors debate over at the Wall Street Journal (h/t @mdmcdonald) with The Economics Behind the Border Pile-Up. I don't think that the title accurately covers all David writes about in the piece but economic motivations/disruptions is certainly part of it. 

For the most part, David wants us to include a discussion of the negative consequences that the movement of people from Central America to the US causes back in the region. There is inflation as the remittances sent home really distort local economies and there is the break up of families as men often head north leaving wives and children behind. Even family reunification in the US runs its own risks.

In the Guatemalan town where I do research, approximately 20% of the working-age male population has departed for the U.S. Some men are paragons and send home every dollar they can. Thanks to their remittances, some children eat better, are better clothed and schooled. But remittances are never a secure income stream, and not merely because of U.S. deportation policies. Many migrants fail to find steady work. Some fall victim to cheap beer and other amusements. The longer they stay in the U.S., the more likely they are to start a second family.

One way to hold the original family together is for the mother and children to come north. But family reunification is no panacea even when it can be done legally. When an earner remits to his wife and children in Central America, the money goes much further than it does in the U.S. Once everyone reaches El Norte, even two parents working for the minimum wage may not be able to support a family. So their children get an education in downward mobility and relative deprivation, which is one reason immigrants brought here as boys run a high risk of being sucked into gangs.

David's work is mostly in Nebaj (here's an earlier post from David on Migration from Nebaj) where gang violence is less of a motivation for those leaving than economic necessity and family reunification. That is somewhat consistent with DHS reports of economic motivations causing people to flee from Guatemala and gang motivations causing people to flee from El Salvador and Honduras. Given that is the case, I'd be careful how much to generalize from Nebaj to the entire Central American experience.

It is important to add to the entire immigration narrative that successful (divided families, remittances that distort local economies) and unsuccessful (injury, death, crushing debt) migration to the US both cause problems back in Central America. Just like there are positive and negative consequences from documented and undocumented migration in the US, the same is true for the effect on the towns/countries from which the migrants came.

However, I'm not aware of the evidence that two working immigrant parents makes matters worse for the entire family in the US (see paragraph two above) - increased poverty in absolute and relative terms and a greater likelihood that your children will join gangs in the US. That is what he says, right? If he arguing that family reunification is worse than just having one family member in the US sending money back to Guatemala? It's plausible and it's not my research area but it just doesn't entirely sound right to me.

Was it really necessary to bash immigrant rights activists?

Immigrant-rights activists insist that unauthorized border-crossers are victims of human-rights abuses. If migrants have not been victimized by their countries of origin, the argument goes, they must have been victimized by U.S. border agents' attempt to stop them. Advocates also argue that migrants have been displaced by wrongheaded U.S. policies, such as supporting dictatorships or free trade, so the U.S. has a moral obligation to accept them.

Look, I don't always agree with the activist left but this seemed unnecessary to the overall theme of the op-ed. Immigration often causes problems that goes unnoticed in the media and family reunification might not be the panacea that some hope it to be. It seemed an unnecessary cheap shot (not that I haven't been guilty myself).

Anyway, it's another unique contribution to the public immigration debate.

Decreasing homicide rates lead to surge in unaccompanied minors?

Obviously, violence is one of the main causes of why so many unaccompanied minors and families are escaping the Northern Triangle to neighboring countries and the United States. However, I'm skeptical of those who have been citing homicide statistics to demonstrate their point.

Guatemala has seen four consecutive years of decreasing homicide rates. Last year's decrease, however, is the result of population growth (total homicides were higher). Last I read, murders are down nearly 10 percent this year.

El Salvador has had two consecutive years of lower murder rates bringing its rate down from ~70 to ~40 per 100,000. I get the increasing impression that the number for the last two years was higher than reported given the reported increase in disappearances but not enough disappearances to bring the number to higher than what it was in 2011 (when there were still disappearances but no one was paying much attention). And 2014 isn't looking too good.

Honduras' homicide rate is in another league compared to its neighbors as it is somewhere between 80 and 90. However, last year's rate seems to have been slightly lower than 2012 and this year is looking better than last.

en Honduras también está bajando la violencia homicida! pic.twitter.com/j0rIAg7IQj
— Carlos Mendoza (@camendoza72) July 7, 2014

The homicide rates are approximate. There is some discrepancy over how to determine what is a homicide versus some other type of violent death in each country. There are individuals who are disappeared and sometimes presumed murdered but are not included in statistics. And international and domestic institutions use different population estimates. These all affect the homicide rates. However, in none of the three countries does a recent spike in homicide rates explain the spike in unaccompanied minors.

I'd also say its better to look at homicide stats broken down geographically anyway. Seventy-nine out of El Salvador's 262 municipalities had experienced ZERO homicides as of a few weeks ago. That's 30% of the country's municipalities. And in Guatemala, 126 out of its 333 municipalities had experienced ZERO homicides as of the end of April. That's 38% of the country's municipalities (follow @camendoza72 who reports on crime trends). If homicides are causing people to flee, we would want to see a relationship at the municipal or departmental level rather than just compared to similarly poor Nicaragua.

And if a surge in homicides was causing the surge in unaccompanied minors, we would have expected the flood years ago (unless this is something of a lagged effect). Here is the regional homicide rate over time thanks to Carlos Mendoza. Murders increased following the adoption of mano dura policies and the increase in drug trafficking throughout the region.

Again, violence is a strong cause of the "surge" (don't you hate that word, I just think of Iraq). However, the correlation with increasing homicide rates doesn't work. I'd focus more on reported forced gang recruitment and extortion figures (these numbers are even shakier), crime victimization surveys, lost hope, family reunification pressures, rumors, and the list goes on and on.

Former Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo to be released in February

Former Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo is scheduled to be released from prison in February 2015. Portillo pleaded guilty to accepting $2.5 million in bribes from Taiwan and funneling the money through US banks. While I applaud efforts to hold Portillo accountable, the whole affair really seems to have collapsed.

Portillo was acquitted in a Guatemalan court under what seems to have been suspicious circumstances. He was taken into custody and deported to the US in a manner which some say violated Guatemalan law. He was alleged to have received and/or stolen tens of millions of dollars. Yet, all we now have is his admission to receiving $2.5 and more or less time served. He was only extradited to the US in May 2013 and will be let out less than two years later.

What's next? Run for the Guatemalan Congress?

From gangs to coffee rust: Push factors for Central American migrants

David Agren has From gangs to coffee rust: Push factors for Central American migrants for Catholic News Service in which I am quoted. David does a good jobs looking at both the push and pull factors that are leading hundreds of thousands of Hondurans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans to flee their homes. One push factor that I hadn't thought of coffee rust.

Honduras has struggled since a 2009 coup, which ushered in instability and allowed drug cartels to subsequently take advantage of the increasing instability and impunity to use the country as a transit point.

Gangs also grew in power, while a disease known as coffee rust wiped out the most recent coffee crop, throwing hundreds of thousands of poor Hondurans out of work. But no one reason explains the exodus of children, said Juan Sheenan, country director for Catholic Relief Services, the charitable arm of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.

"It's been a combination of a number of push factors, and the new ingredient is this coffee rust," Sheenan said.

In the 1960s and 1970s, economic crisis in the countryside forced thousands of jobless and landless campesinos to flee to the urban areas of the region. The arrival of large numbers of rural campesinos overwhelmed city services and helped contribute to calls for reform and revolution. Today, you still see rural Central Americans moving to the cities to escape the grinding poverty of the countryside but you also see them heading directly for neighboring countries and the United States. 

You can read David's article here.

The Guatemalan guerrillas committed the Batzul massacre too?

“When the Mountains Tremble” (1983) is one of the most powerful films on the Guatemalan civil war. It won numerous awards and helped propel Rigoberta Menchu to international audiences. Unfortunately, while the film gets much right, one of the most important stories from the film appears to have been just plain wrong.

A dramatic scene from the 1983 documentary will be corrected to show that the Batzul massacre highlighted in the film was committed not by the military, but by leftist rebels disguised as soldiers.

“We intend to make a correction that will clarify what happened,” Yates said in a statement last month. “It stands as a reminder of the terrible human costs of the violence in 1982-83.”

She said she will also amend a 2011 follow-up documentary, “Granito: How to Nail a Dictator.”

The seventeen men were killed by the Guerrilla Army of the Poor because they had been collaborating with the military. One of the surprising things that I learned was that the 1999 Commission for Historical Clarification had determined that the Batzul massacre had been committed by the EGP yet it took over another decade and David Stoll's investigation to get the matter corrected.

David Stoll, an anthropology professor at Middlebury College who has worked extensively in Guatemala, said that Yates’ original depiction of the Batzul massacre could be attributed to the “fog of war.”

Stoll questioned, though, why it took Yates so long to check the facts and why the footage from Batzul was reused in “Granito” even after the rebels’ responsibility had surfaced.

“People like Pam were not nearly as skeptical of the guerrillas as they should have been,” Stoll said.

Pamela Yates seems to have taken the high road when the contradictory information was brought to her attention a few year's ago (see this Facebook post) but not her followers who seem to owe David and the victims of the guerrilla massacre an apology. They really don't like David because it appears his research makes them uncomfortable and does not conform to their black and white worldview. Pamela has now agreed to change the original film and Granito follow-up to somehow reflect the new details of the guerrilla massacre.

It's unfortunate that the correction took so long and that of all the massacres committed during the conflict, overwhelmingly by the military, they had to get this one so wrong. It will but the news should not take away from the fact that the military and its allies committed the vast majority of human rights violations, including massacres, between 1960-1996. In many ways, the news is similar to Stoll's investigation of Menchu. Her story was mostly correct but a number of irregularities has undermined the book's authenticity (at least for some).

Information about the Batzul massacre comes shortly after a former ORPA commander was convicted and sentenced to 90 years in prison on the charges of homicide and crimes against humanity.

Former Guatemalan guerrilla sentenced to 90 years for massacre

Former ORPA commander Fermin Felipe Solano Barillas was sentenced to 90 years in prison after having been found guilty on the charges of homicide and crimes against humanity involving the massacre 22 civilians in the village of El Aguacate, Chimaltenango in 1988.

"This (sentence) is aimed at setting a legal precedent, to prevent these acts from ever being repeated," the court said in its ruling.

Solano Barillas was the first guerrilla convicted of any crimes committed during the armed conflict while a handful of military, police, and PAC officials have been convicted and sentenced. Efrain Rios Montt's trial is expected to start up once again in January but I, like many I presume, have my doubts.

Perhaps the Guatemalan right will now stop complaining that (former AG) Claudia Paz y Paz and the justice system have only gone after individuals aligned with the state and not the guerrillas.

Violent deaths are down nearly 10% so far this year according to INACIF statistics.

A minor was arrested after throwing a grenade at a water purification truck in Zona 18 of Guatemala City. One woman was killed. The seventeen year old is a member of the 18th Street Gang and the motive is believed to have been extortion. Should give added business to the armored clothing industry.

The Guatemalan government is interfering in the academic autonomy and institutionality of FLACSO. It also canceled the temporary residence of two volunteers with Peace Brigades International (here and here).

Happy Holidays!

US and El Salvador make progress on second MCC compact

The second Millennium Challenge Compact for El Salvador has been held up for a number of reasons. Last year it was Gold Corp and Enel pressuring US congressmen to use the possibility of a second compact to advance their business interests. The US government has also required passage of a new Public Private Partnership law (P3) that opens up additional economic areas to foreign/partnered investment. Senator Leahy and others have been upset with the the limited progress that the Funes/FMLN administration had demonstrated on tackling corruption and money laundering. And many of the communities that live along the coast where the next phase of development is scheduled to take place have been fighting the proposed project although I am not sure whether they have slowed down the passage of FOMILENIO II in any way. Then there were the elections with the US seemingly deciding to wait until they were concluded to move forward.

Another hurdle now seems to be passed. Sixteen Democratic members of Congress sent a letter to Secretary John Kerry, chair of the MCC board, requesting that the US not condition a second compact on a requirement that the Salvadoran government change its seed procurement for its Family Agriculture Plan.

To condition the final approval of the MCC compact on the elimination of a provision that enables local producers to access government procurement mechanisms poses a risk to El Salvador’s national food security efforts. Agriculture and food security are outside the scope of the compact, yet critical to the country’s development. For both of these reasons, elimination of support for small-scale farmers to improve their livelihoods through domestic seed production has no place as a condition for signing the MCC compact with El Salvador.

We believe it is in the best interests of U.S. foreign policy and development policy to desist from conditioning the MCC compact on the Salvadoran government’s seed purchase for the Family Agriculture Plan. We respectfully request your swift action to ensure that the signing and administration of MCC compact will, ultimately, uphold the U.S. development goals of poverty reduction, and independent and sustainable development. In addition, we look forward to your timely response regarding the steps you will continue to take in order to ensure the agreement’s final approval and implementation.

On Tuesday, it was reported that the US and El Salvador had made progress on the second compact.

But on Tuesday, MCC and the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador both set a different tone, both signaling that El Salvador has shown real progress in answering the U.S. demands and it is time to move on.

“We are seeing commitment by El Salvador to complete their action plan,” said MCC spokesman John Gagain, when asked about the issue. “We are pleased that their government has provided assurances that it intends to pursue future corn and bean seed purchases under a mechanism that is transparent, competitive and compliant with Salvadoran law and CAFTA-DR.”

Gagain’s choice of words closely matched draft talking points for the U.S. Embassy on Tuesday. The net impact suggested the administration was cutting its losses after a sometimes embarrassing fight and hoped to steer attention back to the money laundering issue.

The US is more concerned with tackling money laundering in El Salvador. The country's use of the US dollar makes its easier to launder money there. The fact that $4 billion is sent to El Salvador from the US in relatively small amounts doesn't help either. The US also wants El Salvador's help in reducing the number of unaccompanied minors heading north to the US and didn't want the attacks on the country's seed procurement program to undermine those efforts.

The US and Salvadoran governments have not always seen eye-to-eye but have managed to cooperate when they've had to. With questionable proposed investments in coastal and maritime areas, US interference in Salvadoran domestic politics, and El Salvador's limited progress tackling money laundering, corruption, and increasing questions surrounding General Munguia Payes and the gang truce, I'm not sure many people are happy with the second compact. That's doesn't mean it won't help but I can't say anyone is going to be able to point to this second compact as a shining example of the US and Salvadoran government working together to invest in El Salvador's future.

US issues sexual assault warning for Antigua, Guatemala

The US has travel warnings for Honduras and El Salvador but not for Guatemala. Given that we tend to lump all three northern triangle countries together when it comes to violence, it's kind of surprising. Well, while it's not a countrywide warning (not sure what it would take for that), the US has now issued a Security Message for U.S. Citizens: Sexual Assault for Antigua, Guatemala.

The U.S. Embassy Guatemala City, Guatemala reminds U.S. citizens in Guatemala of the dangers of sexual assault. It has come to our attention that at least three U.S. citizens have been the victims of sexual assault in the city of Antigua since April. We are aware of similar crimes committed against other foreign tourists in Antigua in this same time frame. In some scenarios, date rape drugs may have been used to disable the victim. Several of these crimes have taken place in bars, clubs, or after-hours clubs.

We suggest that U.S. citizens take the following precautions:

Do not go out alone at night.

Do not walk alone in isolated areas.

Use the buddy system to ensure that all members of the group are accounted for.

Do not accept drinks from strangers or casual acquaintances.

Keep an eye on all drinks in public places.

Avoid late-night or illegal after-hours clubs.

It's a very specific warning and must have US officials worried since I can't say that it is a new development. I remember hearing assaults against foreign women when I was in Antigua in 1998. Antigua is a beautiful place but there are places you do not want to be caught after dark such as Cerro de la Cruz where women have been victimized over the years. A police presence has been helpful there but I have heard that whether or not police are present depends upon the budget.

One also hears stories from ex-pats and reporters who live there where US and foreign women have been victims of assaults during home invasions and at least one kidnapping. These stories have not made the news from what I am aware.

"They have good devices" in Guatemala

Michael Dougherty and Tricia Olsen have a new article on “They have good devices: Trust, mining and the microsociology of environmental decision-making” in the Journal of Cleaner Production. Here's the abstract:

Since the 1990s, transnational mining firms have increasingly sought new deposits in the developing world. This shift in global patterns of mineral activity has led to contestation by mining host community residents and their activist allies. A swell of recent literature in the social sciences explores this phenomenon, largely accepting conventional wisdom about the causal forces behind individuals' choices to contest mining.

This article examines individual decision-making around mineral conflicts in an effort to bring the microsocial into focus. Trust is an essential and largely ignored dimension of mining conflicts.

We argue that two types of trust—institutional and relational trust—help explain how individuals form preferences about mining in their territory. We further argue that individuals' sense of self-efficacy underlies their decisions about whom to trust or distrust. We also seek to deepen the social theorization of trust by challenging the common binary of affective and cognitive trust. To make this argument we draw from a mixed-methods study of responses to gold mining in Guatemala.

 Michael previously provided a guest post on Complex support for mining in Guatemala.