Father Toño arrested in El Salvador, alleged gang involvement

Salvadoran authorities were busy on Wednesday. They arrested Roman Catholic priest Antonio Rodriguez Tercero. They allege that Father Toño "tried to get favorable treatment for Salvadoran gang members and helped smuggled contraband into prisons" (including cell phones and drugs) but that is all we know so far. In addition, authorities arrested 12 police officers, two judges, a number of court employees, two prosecution officials, and various gang members - 125 in total. They are accused of having collaborated with the 18th Street gang [and other criminal groups].

While Father Toño worked with the gangs in Mejicanos for a number of years, he was very critical of the government's facilitation of a truce between the country's two main gains. However, after discussions with Bishop Fabio Colindres last year, Father Toño changed his mind and then became a supporter of the national truce [and then became an opponent once again].

@serobbins is now providing updates on Twitter.

Strategy...what strategy? The Funes Government and Gangs in El Salvador

The Journal of Latin American Studies also has "De-securitising and Re-securitising Gang Policies: The Funes Government and Gangs in El Salvador" (gated) by Chris Van Der Borgh and Wim Savenije in its most recent edition.

This article analyses the gang policies of the first years of the Funes administration in El Salvador, from June 2009 until July 2012. Using securitisation theory, it explains why the administration returned to an emphasis on extraordinary measures, most of them repressive, to deal with gangs. It argues that these measures were the product of an ongoing and dynamic process in which the government was but one of the players in a complex field constituted by numerous actors. The return to repressive measures as well as the support and facilitation of a ‘gang truce’ were not the result of a rational design or a predetermined agenda, but should be seen as a series of moves in a political conjuncture, in which the Salvadorean government needed to communicate to different audiences messages of being in control.

I appreciated the discussion of the Funes administration's gang policy upon taking office and up through 2011. The Funes administration entered office intending to de-securitise the government's approach to gangs. However, the gangs were too strong, the government did not have adequate policies to effectively deal with gang prevention and rehabilitation, and the media, public and private sector had little little patience for policies that that did not look tough. The government considered negotiating with gangs at this time (2009-2010) but decided not to do so.

I don't think that the article was too strong on what led the administration to support the 2012 gang truce but there we see another two-pronged schizophrenic policy as well. )The authors might have been able to put together a stronger second half of the paper had they written it with what we know in 2014.) At the same time that the government was involved in facilitating a truce between the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, it was cracking down on gang activities. I remember receiving emails from a friend last year from a friend in San Salvador who talked about the heavy-handed police and military presence in poor neighborhoods. They were kicking down doors, roughing up young men, and threatening those who got in the way...all while the truce was still pretty strong.

The administration had hoped that its continued arrest and prosecution of gang members and reliance on the military would provide them with the political cover to support an unpopular gang truce. It didn't work. The government never did gain the support of the population or the United States for the truce and homicides have increased 70 percent during the first six months of the year.

One Parish Priest in El Salvador's Popular Movement...the FMLN

The Journal of Latin American Studies (now on Twitter at @JLAScamb) has two interesting articles on El Salvador in their most recent edition. The first takes a look at the life of Tecoluca's Father David Rodriguez. "Ideas and Leaders in Contentious Politics: One Parish Priest in El Salvador's Popular Movement" written by Loyola University Chicago's Peter Sanchez.

This paper examines the actions of one Salvadorean priest – Padre David Rodríguez – in one parish – Tecoluca – to underscore the importance of religious leadership in the rise of El Salvador's contentious political movement that began in the early 1970s, when the guerrilla organisations were only just beginning to develop. Catholic leaders became engaged in promoting contentious politics, however, only after the Church had experienced an ideological conversion, commonly referred to as liberation theology.

A focus on one priest, in one parish, allows for generalisation, since scores of priests, nuns and lay workers in El Salvador followed the same injustice frame and tactics that generated extensive political mobilisation throughout the country. While structural conditions, collective action and resource mobilisation are undoubtedly necessary, the case of religious leaders in El Salvador suggests that ideas and leadership are of vital importance for the rise of contentious politics at a particular historical moment.

While we generally tend to identify the Salvadoran civil war as beginning in 1979 (following the failure of the October 15 coup) or 1980 (Romero's murder or the creation of the FMLN), it is important to remember that the Salvadoran guerrillas spent the entire 1970s, even as early as the late 1960s, preparing for war. They were recruiting new members, developing their ideology, and raising money, often through kidnappings.

In this article, we learn about Father Rodriguez who integrated into the FPL in 1974. He went on to live a pretty interesting life which isn't covered in this article except for Footnote number 62 - always read the footnotes.

Padre Rodríguez worked for the FPL from 1975 until the end of the civil war in 1992, also working for the FMLN when the FPL joined that organisation. Rodríguez did not serve as a combatant, but rather helped to organise CEBs and later raised money for the armed rebellion and for communities in guerrilla-controlled territory, travelling to the United States, Europe and Latin America. At the end of the conflict he made an effort to return to the Church, but the bishop of San Vicente at the time insisted that he issue an apology for the revolutionary and political path he had taken, a condition that he found unacceptable. Eventually Padre Rodríguez continued working with the FMLN, which was transforming itself into a political party, and became a candidate for the Legislative Assembly in 1997. He was elected in 1997 and 2000, and more recently in 2009 and 2012. Thus Padre David Rodríguez, a traditional parish priest, became a liberationist priest, a guerrilla priest and finally a political priest, always retaining close ties to the Salvadorean peasantry

The second article comes tomorrow.